Embracing Ambiguity and Adopting Propriety: Using Comparative Law to Explore Avenues for Protecting the LGBT Population under Article 7 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court by Barrera Moore, Charles
University of Minnesota Law School
Scholarship Repository
Minnesota Law Review
2017
Embracing Ambiguity and Adopting Propriety:
Using Comparative Law to Explore Avenues for
Protecting the LGBT Population under Article 7 of
the Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court
Charles Barrera Moore
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Minnesota Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Minnesota Law
Review collection by an authorized administrator of the Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact lenzx009@umn.edu.
Recommended Citation
Barrera Moore, Charles, "Embracing Ambiguity and Adopting Propriety: Using Comparative Law to Explore Avenues for Protecting
the LGBT Population under Article 7 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court" (2017). Minnesota Law Review. 157.
https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr/157
  
 
1287 
Note 
 
Embracing Ambiguity and Adopting Propriety: 
Using Comparative Law To Explore Avenues for 
Protecting the LGBT Population Under Article 7 
of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court 
Charles Barrera Moore 
In recent years, there has been a dramatic increase in the 
attention afforded to persecution of identity-based groups with-
in the international human rights context. Most notably, per-
haps, the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court1 
(“Rome Statute”) was seen as a crucial step by the international 
community in creating a mechanism by which offenders of hu-
man rights would be punished.2 The Rome Statute was consid-
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Brian Gerd for providing a great sounding board while formulating my thesis. 
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the Minnesota Law Review for their work on my piece. All errors are my own. 
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 1. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, 37 
I.L.M. 1002, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 [hereinafter Rome Statute]. 
 2. See, e.g., Antonio Cassese, The Statute of the International Criminal 
Court: Some Preliminary Reflections, 10 EUR. J. INT’L L. 144, 145 (1999) 
(“[T]he ICC could mark a real turning point in the world community . . . [and] 
the ICC [is] a significant building block in the construction of a truly interna-
tional legal community.”); Marlies Glasius, Expertise in the Cause of Justice: 
Global Civil Society Influence on the Statute for an International Criminal 
Court, in GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY 2002, at 137 (Marlies Glasius et al. eds., 
2002) (“[T]he International Criminal Court . . . will be an important step in the 
ongoing transition towards an international legal order that is less based on 
state sovereignty and more oriented towards the protection of all citizens of 
the world from abuse of power.”); Philippe Kirsch, The Role of the Internation-
al Criminal Court in Enforcing International Criminal Law, 22 AM. U. INT’L L. 
REV. 539, 540–41 (2007) (“For experts on human rights it is clear that the pro-
tection of individuals from violations of human rights and humanitarian law 
requires appropriate mechanisms to enforce the law. . . . Eventually, a perma-
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ered especially progressive in its treatment of gender-based 
crimes, both in recognizing that they could be committed in 
times of peace as crimes against humanity and by expanding 
the list of gender-based acts that would constitute a crime 
against humanity.3 Aside from serving merely as evidence of in-
ternational recognition of human rights, the establishment of 
the International Criminal Court (ICC) demonstrated a will-
ingness by the international community as a whole to protect 
those whose rights had been violated.4 
To date, however, this growing recognition of the need to 
hold human rights violators criminally liable in the ICC has 
not yet extended to those that persecute on the basis of sexual 
orientation. Article 7(1)(h) of the Rome Statute provides the cri-
teria for crimes against humanity and seems to offer the most 
logical avenue towards prosecuting those who persecute mem-
bers of the lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) 
community.5 It states that persecution “against any identifiable 
group or collectivity on political, racial, national, ethnic, cultur-
al, religious, gender as defined in paragraph 3, or other grounds 
that are universally recognized” can be prosecuted.6 Yet, “gen-
der” is defined in the following way: “the two sexes, male and 
female, within the context of society. The term ‘gender’ does not 
 
nent truly international court was necessary to respond to the most serious 
international crimes and to overcome the limitations of the ad hoc tribunals.”). 
 3. See THE OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR, INT’L CRIMINAL COURT, POLICY 
PAPER ON SEXUAL AND GENDER-BASED CRIMES 9 (2014), https://www.icc-cpi 
.int/iccdocs/otp/OTP-Policy-Paper-on-Sexual-and-Gender-Based-Crimes--June 
-2014.pdf (“Over the past few decades, the international community has taken 
many concrete steps in response to increasing calls to recognise sexual and 
gender-based crimes as serious crimes nationally and internationally. . . . At 
the Rome Conference, States agreed upon explicit provisions in the Statute of 
the ICC, recognising various forms of sexual and gender-based crimes as 
amongst the most serious crimes of concern to the international community. 
The Statute is the first instrument in international law to include an expan-
sive list of sexual and gender-based crimes as war crimes relating to both in-
ternational and non-international armed conflict.” (citations omitted)). 
 4. The Preamble of the Rome Statute acknowledges as much, stating 
that parties to the treaty were “[m]indful that . . . millions of children, women 
and men have been victims of unimaginable atrocities that deeply shock the 
conscience of humanity” and were “[d]etermine[d] to put an end to impunity 
for the perpetrators of these crimes.” Rome Statute, supra note 1, pmbl. 
 5. Classifying widespread attacks against homosexuals as acts of geno-
cide could certainly serve as a route towards prosecution; however, it has been 
made clear that the LGBT community is not a group against which genocide 
can be committed. See infra note 64 and accompanying text. 
 6. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 7(1)(h) (emphasis added). 
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indicate any meaning different from the above.”7 This confound-
ing definition has been criticized at length8 and as long as it 
remains unaddressed, the uncertainty about whether or not 
persecution on the basis of sexual orientation can be brought in 
front of the ICC will remain. Without action from the Office of 
the Prosecutor (OTP) clarifying the definition, it is unlikely 
that any case will be brought in front of the ICC seeking to 
prosecute persecutors of the LGBT community and those crim-
inals will continue to act outside of the law. This result is en-
tirely unacceptable not only for the body of international hu-
man rights law as a whole but also for the ICC, which has 
made a commitment to “put an end to impunity for the perpe-
trators of these crimes” and “guarantee lasting respect for and 
the enforcement of international justice.”9 
This is a current reality that the international community 
must confront. In Kenya, private mobs have attacked the LGBT 
community, and in Egypt, the government has likewise target-
ed its LGBT citizens in a series of arrests and police raids.10 
Further, as of 2014, there were thirty-seven signatories to the 
Rome Statute that criminalize homosexuality.11 
The ICC has a unique ability to bring in many states that 
are situated in regions where domestic courts are either unable 
to or reluctant to prosecute.12 Therefore, the ICC needs to act in 
situations where there have been direct, persecutory actions 
against members of the LGBT community by the government 
or by private parties.13 While some countries, when adopting 
 
 7. Id. art. 7(3). 
 8. See infra Part I.C.2. 
 9. Rome Statute, supra note 1, pmbl. 
 10. See infra Part I.A. 
 11. See Michael Bohlander, Criminalising LGBT Persons Under National 
Criminal Law and Article 7(1)(h) and (3) of the ICC Statute, 5 GLOBAL POL’Y 
401, 408 (2014). 
 12. See Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 17(1)(a). 
 13. Additionally, the time is ripe for discussing expanding the scope of 
criminals the ICC is willing to prosecute. The ICC opened its first case in Sep-
tember 2009 and is thus still formulating its precedents. See Daniel Donovan, 
International Criminal Court: Successes and Failures, INT’L POL’Y DIG. (Mar. 
23, 2012), http://www.intpolicydigest.org/2012/03/23/international-criminal 
-court-successes-and-failures (discussing early operations of the ICC). Also, 
the ICC has had a limited scope geographically as it has only addressed situa-
tions on the continent of Africa. Situations Under Investigation, INT’L CRIM. 
CT., https://www.icc-cpi.int/pages/situations.aspx (last visited Nov. 28, 2016) 
(indicating that formal investigations have been opened against individuals in 
the following states: Uganda, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Cen-
tral African Republic, Georgia, Mali, Sudan, Libya, Kenya, and Côte d’Ivoire). 
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the provisions of the Rome Statute, have explicitly included 
sexual orientation as a protected ground,14 many need interna-
tional intervention and pressure to bring these criminals to jus-
tice. The interpretation of “gender” is left to the ICC15 and, as 
OTP brings cases in front of the ICC, it has a great deal of pow-
er and discretion in framing and guiding which offenses are in-
vestigated and prosecuted.16 Yet, without action from either the 
ICC or domestic jurisdictions that have so far failed to act, 
those actors who have enjoyed impunity for crimes will likely 
continue to do so.  
This Note argues that, in its current construction, the defi-
nition of “gender” found in Article 7 of the Rome Statute should 
include protection of the LGBT community. The debate that 
surrounded this contentious definition during the negotiations 
of the Rome Statute has followed it through the early years of 
the ICC,17 but that ambiguity does not preclude protection of 
this vulnerable group. Because of the infant nature of the 
ICC,18 it is appropriate that, in developing its jurisprudence, 
the ICC look to human rights courts that have encountered 
 
The Office of the Prosecutor has begun preliminary investigations in many 
countries outside of the African continent, but has not moved those cases to a 
formal investigation or prosecution stage. See Preliminary Examinations, 
INT’L CRIM. CT., https://www.icc-cpi.int/pages/preliminary-examinations.aspx 
(last visited Nov. 28, 2016). Therefore, if ever there were a time to expand the 
scope of the prosecutors’ reach, a time when the ICC is still in its infancy and 
has yet to reach other parts of the world would seem to be ideal. 
 14. See, e.g., An Act Defining and Penalizing Crimes Against Internation-
al Humanitarian Law, Genocide and Other Crimes Against Humanity, Organ-
izing Jurisdiction, Designating Special Courts, and for Related Purposes, Rep. 
Act No. 9851, § 6(h), 106:9 O.G. 1120 (July 27, 2009) (Phil.) (“For the purpose 
of this act, ‘other crimes against humanity’ means any of the following acts 
when committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against 
any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack: . . . Persecution against 
any identifiable group or collectivity on political, racial, national, ethnic, cul-
tural, religious, gender, sexual orientation or other grounds . . . .” (emphasis 
added)). 
 15. See Valerie Oosterveld, The Definition of “Gender” in the Rome Statute 
of the International Criminal Court: A Step Forward or Back for International 
Criminal Justice?, 18 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 55, 82 (2005) (“Since the interpreta-
tion of ‘gender’ is left with the ICC itself, there are very real concerns by many 
commentators that the ICC will choose a narrow and regressive reading of the 
‘gender’ definition.”). 
 16. See, e.g., Allison Marston Danner, Enhancing the Legitimacy and Ac-
countability of Prosecutorial Discretion at the International Criminal Court, 97 
AM. J. INT’L L. 510, 510 (2003) (identifying the important political and legal 
role of OTP in its ability to determine what cases are brought to the ICC). 
 17. See infra Part I.C. 
 18. See infra Part I.B.2. 
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cases involving members of the LGBT community.19 Of particu-
lar importance, this Note explores the ways human rights 
courts, namely the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) 
and the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 
(IACHR), have protected the rights of the LGBT community 
and discusses how those approaches could be utilized by the 
ICC. OTP has made signals that it is moving in this direction, 
but it needs to act decisively to end the debate altogether. 
While several other authors have identified the shortcomings of 
the Rome Statute’s definition of “gender,” this Note analyzes 
decisions by human rights courts and imports those teachings 
in the context of the ICC. By looking at these decisions, the ICC 
can utilize the tools it already has in place to prosecute offend-
ers of LGBT rights. In order to solidify such an understanding 
of the Rome Statute’s definition of “gender,” the OTP, as the 
body that brings cases in front of the ICC, should clarify the 
definition to cover cases involving persecution of LGBT indi-
viduals. An exploration of the legislative history, the flexibility 
maintained by the statutory language, and the practice of hu-
man rights courts all suggest this is the proper conclusion. 
Part I begins by establishing that the Rome Statute has 
failed to protect the LGBT community and details the legisla-
tive history that led to the current definition. This discussion is 
crucial in demonstrating that the definition of “gender” main-
tains flexibility while other provisions of the treaty are likely 
unable to protect the LGBT community from persecution. Part 
I concludes by discussing the work done by international hu-
man rights courts to protect the rights of the LGBT population 
and developments in the international community. Part II ad-
dresses the flexibility of the term “gender” under the Rome 
Statute, rejecting the arguments some have proffered that the 
definition denies protection of the LGBT community, and dis-
cusses the opportunity for embracing the openness of such a 
formulation. Finally, Part II establishes that, even though the 
roles of human rights courts and criminal courts may differ 
slightly, lessons from human rights courts can be applied di-
rectly in the context of the ICC. Last, Part III applies lessons 
from the ECHR and the IACHR to demonstrate how the ICC 
could act similarly to bring to justice criminals who have perse-
cuted the LGBT community. This Part also explores develop-
ments in the international legal community and in human 
 
 19. See infra Part II.C. 
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rights courts to establish that OTP should promulgate a policy 
that explicitly states that the LGBT community is considered 
part of the Rome Statute’s definition of “gender.” The Note con-
cludes by proposing specific language that could be adopted by 
OTP to support the ICC’s obligations to uphold international 
human rights and protect those who have been systematically 
targeted by criminals. 
I.  THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE ROME STATUTE, THE 
DEFINITION OF “GENDER,” AND THE PRACTICES OF 
HUMAN RIGHTS COURTS   
In order to proceed, it is crucial to understand that the 
LGBT community is in fact a group that is currently persecut-
ed, that the ICC has the tools to bring such criminals under its 
jurisdiction, and that using Article 7’s utilization of “gender” as 
the basis for protection provides the best avenue towards pros-
ecution. Section A shows that the LGBT community is one that 
is in need of protection from the ICC. Section B lays out the 
language employed by the Rome Statute and describes how 
that language has been utilized. By analyzing the language 
found within the Rome Statute and how that language came to 
be, Section C discusses the ongoing debate over the definition’s 
protection of the LGBT community. Next, Section D analyzes 
the elements needed to prosecute under Article 7 of the Rome 
Statute in order to demonstrate that the only element missing 
from prosecuting these crimes is whether or not the LGBT 
community fits under one of the protected grounds. Although at 
first glance it may appear the LGBT community would be pro-
tected as a “universally recognized” group, Section E explores 
why that may not be so, leaving gender as the only means un-
der which these crimes can be prosecuted. Last, Section F ana-
lyzes how international human rights courts specifically and 
the international community generally have understood the 
rights of members of the LGBT community. 
A. PERSECUTION OF THE LGBT COMMUNITY BY SIGNATORIES TO 
THE ROME STATUTE 
There are currently groups of individuals who are perse-
cuted because of their membership in the LGBT community 
and their respective countries’ views of that group. These at-
tacks often come from private individuals who the government 
has been unwilling or unable to control; yet, some of the perse-
cution originates from governments themselves. The ICC was 
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designed to protect human rights in both instances.20 The fol-
lowing situations are recent examples of persecutory treatment 
in countries who have signed the Rome Statute. 
In Kenya, mobs have directed attacks at individuals “based 
on their sexual orientation and gender identity.”21 Although 
private individuals, and not the state, committed these acts, 
the government of Kenya is complicit in that it has refused to 
take action to prosecute these individuals.22 One notable in-
stance in Kenya involved a group of approximately 200 people 
attacking gay and bisexual men and transgendered women who 
worked as peer educators at an HIV clinic after rumors of a gay 
wedding circulated in February 2010.23 The victims of these at-
tacks recounted being burned and beaten by the mob and later, 
once in the safety of the police station, the mob threatened to 
burn down the building.24 These victims are not only subjected 
to these attacks but must continue to live in countries where 
groups, which at times take the form of mobs, harbor these feel-
ings towards the LGBT community. Attacks such as these are 
prime examples of cases in which the ICC has jurisdiction to 
prosecute under its Article 17 powers as the local government 
is either “unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out the inves-
tigation or prosecution.”25 
There have also been instances in which the government of 
a specific signatory state has been an active participant in the 
persecution of the local LGBT population. For example, the 
Egyptian government has arrested members of the LGBT 
community as a way to distract its citizens from other domestic 
problems.26 It is not illegal to be either gay or transgendered in 
 
 20. See Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 17(1)(a) (“[T]he [ICC] shall de-
termine that a case is inadmissible where . . . [t]he case is being investigated 
or prosecuted by a State which has jurisdiction over it, unless the State is un-
willing or unable to genuinely carry out the investigation or prosecution . . . .” 
(emphasis added)). 
 21. Kenya: Pervasive Homophobic Violence in Coastal Region, HUM. RTS. 
WATCH (Sept. 28, 2015), https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/09/28/kenya 
-pervasive-homophobic-violence-coastal-region. 
 22. Id. 
 23. The Issue Is Violence: Attacks on LGBT People on Kenya’s Coast, HUM. 
RTS. WATCH (Sept. 28, 2015), https://www.hrw.org/report/2015/09/28/issue 
-violence/attacks-lgbt-people-kenyas-coast. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 17. 
 26. Peter Montgomery, The Politics of Anti-Gay Persecution, POL. RES. 
ASSOCIATES (Dec. 19, 2014), http://www.politicalresearch.org/2014/12/19/the 
-politics-of-anti-gay-persecution. 
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Egypt, yet approximately 150 members of the LGBT communi-
ty have been arrested and, as of May 2015, about 100 of those 
individuals remained imprisoned.27 Recently, the government of 
Egypt arrested seven transgendered men for meeting and al-
legedly engaging in “debauchery.”28 Officials have even con-
ducted raids targeted at gay men; notably, twenty-five men 
were arrested in December 2014 during a police raid at a bath-
house in what has been characterized as a crackdown on the 
gay community.29 Although these men were ultimately acquit-
ted,30 there are still others who are convicted under similarly 
dubious charges. Judges have reportedly handed down sen-
tences as long as seven years in such cases.31 Despite the fact 
that there is no law banning homosexual activity of any nature 
in Egypt,32 “people are usually charged with ‘debauchery’ under 
an old law originally intended to combat prostitution. A law 
against ‘immoral advertising’ has also been used to entrap men 
seeking gay partners on the internet.”33 The government has 
engaged in a systematic, widespread, and targeted attack 
against these individuals, a situation that seems ripe for ICC 
investigation and prosecution.34 Yet, despite this ongoing reali-
ty, the ICC has yet to investigate a situation involving the per-
secution of LGBT individuals. 
 
 27. Bel Trew, How Distaste of LGBT People in Egypt Has Turned into 
State-Sponsored Persecution, INDEPENDENT (May 17, 2015), http://www 
.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/how-distaste-of-lgbt-people-in 
-egypt-has-turned-into-state-sponsored-persecution-10256869.html. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Patrick Kingsley, Egyptian TV Crew Criticised over Police Raid on 
Cairo Bath House, THE GUARDIAN (Dec. 9, 2014), https://www.theguardian 
.com/world/2014/dec/09/egypt-police-raid-cairo-bath-house. 
 30. Egypt Court Clears 26 Men Held in Raid on ‘Gay Bathhouse,’ INDE-
PENDENT (Jan. 12, 2015), http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/ 
egypt-court-clears-26-men-held-in-raid-on-gay-bathhouse-9973769.html. 
 31. Trew, supra note 27. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Brian Whitaker, If Homosexuality Isn’t Illegal, Why Is There a Gay 
Crackdown in Egypt?, THE GUARDIAN (Dec. 10, 2014), https://www 
.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/dec/10/homosexuality-gay-crackdown 
-egypt-economic-political-issues?CMP=share_btn_tw. 
 34. This Note focuses only on the definition of “gender” under the Rome 
Statute, but it is important to keep in mind that in order to prosecute the ICC 
would have to meet other threshold qualifications. See Part I.D for a short de-
scription of those other elements. 
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B. THE INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK OF THE ICC AND THE ROME 
STATUTE HAVE BOTH FAILED TO PROTECT THE LGBT 
COMMUNITY 
This Section elucidates why there is a question over the 
definition’s applicability to the LGBT community through an 
examination of the language of the Rome Statute in form and 
in practice. Subsection 1 describes the functions and operations 
of the ICC; Subsection 2 briefly examines the jurisprudence of 
this infant court; Subsection 3 explores the language of the 
Rome Statute at issue; and Subsection 4 establishes that this 
language has not yet been completely understood to protect 
members of the LGBT community. 
1. Structure of the Rome Statute and the ICC 
Drawing on the atrocities that occurred during the twenti-
eth century, namely in Yugoslavia and Rwanda,35 the ICC was 
organized with the purpose of prosecuting “the most serious 
crimes of international concern” while being solely a “comple-
mentary [entity] to national criminal jurisdictions.”36 Its struc-
ture consists of the court itself and other independent organs 
which assist in the functioning of the ICC in general. Of partic-
ular importance for this Note, OTP is responsible for reviewing 
referrals to the ICC, investigating potential cases, and bringing 
any appropriate cases in front of the ICC for prosecution.37 
The ICC functions under certain guidelines, including sev-
eral “general principles of criminal law,”38 its own rules on ju-
risdiction,39 and “complementarity.”40 The ICC has the ability to 
 
 35. INT’L CRIMINAL COURT, UNDERSTANDING THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMI-
NAL COURT 3, https://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/PIDS/publications/UICCEng.pdf 
(last visited Nov. 28, 2016) (“Some of the most heinous crimes were committed 
during the conflicts which marked the twentieth century. Unfortunately, 
many of these violations of international law have remained unpunished. . . . 
The idea of a system of international criminal justice re-emerged after the end 
of the Cold War. However, while negotiations on the ICC Statute were under-
way at the United Nations, the world was witnessing the commission of hei-
nous crimes in the territory of the former Yugoslavia and in Rwanda. . . . The-
se events undoubtedly had a most significant impact on the decision to 
convene the conference which established the ICC in Rome in the summer of 
1998.”). 
 36. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 1. 
 37. Id. art. 42(1). 
 38. Id. pt. 3. 
 39. Id. pt. 2. 
 40. Id. art. 1. 
  
1296 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [101:1287 
 
hear cases in which the defendants are accused of violating one 
of three crimes: genocide,41 crimes against humanity, and war 
crimes.42 The principle of complementarity governs the ICC’s 
jurisdiction and its ability to prosecute. Under this doctrine, 
“national justice systems have the primary responsibility for 
investigating, prosecuting and punishing individuals, in ac-
cordance with their national laws, for crimes falling under the 
jurisdiction of the [ICC].”43 Only if a state is unwilling or unable 
to investigate and/or prosecute should the ICC intervene.44 In 
determining whether or not the state has failed to investigate 
or prosecute, the ICC ought to consider whether a proceeding in 
the country was pursued simply in order to protect the party 
rather than prosecute, whether there has been “unjustified de-
lay” in the prosecution that shows there is not a genuine will to 
prosecute, and whether the proceedings were conducted “inde-
pendently [and] impartially.”45 If a country fails to act on a do-
mestic level, the ICC is permitted to take a case without con-
ducting the analysis in Article 17(1)(a)–(c); this analysis need 
only be undertaken if the country has taken steps to investi-
gate but has not fully followed through to prosecution.46 Addi-
tionally, if the individual has already been tried or the case 
does not present the requisite level of “gravity” of harm, then 
the ICC ought not investigate and prosecute.47 
2. Jurisprudential History of the ICC 
During the years of operation of the ICC, there have been 
five cases that have come to a resolution.48 All five cases involve 
 
 41. For a discussion on the crime of genocide, see infra note 64 and ac-
companying text. 
 42. “War crimes” is defined by an extensive list of offenses that may be 
committed during times of war. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 8(2). 
 43. U.N. Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment 
of an Int’l Criminal Court, 9th plen. mtg. at 7, ¶ 53, U.N. Doc. 
A/CONF.183/SR.9 (July 17, 1998). 
 44. See Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 17(1)(a). 
 45. Id. art. 17(2)(a)–(c). 
 46. JANN K. KLEFFNER, COMPLEMENTARITY IN THE ROME STATUTE AND 
NATIONAL CRIMINAL JURISDICTIONS 105 (Ruth Mackenzie et al. eds., 2008) 
(“In sum, complete inaction on the national level would thus allow the ICC to 
take up a case without having to enter into an assessment of the admissibility 
criteria in Article 17 (1)(a) to (c). The provisions on complementarity only ap-
ply once a State takes, at a minimum, initial investigative steps.”). 
 47. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 17(1)(c)–(d). 
 48. Closed Stage, INT’L CRIM. CT., https://www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/closed 
.aspx (last visited Nov. 28, 2016). 
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African men accused of war crimes and crimes against humani-
ty committed during armed, political conflict; none have led to 
prosecution as each has been cleared of charges, many due to a 
lack of evidence.49 Callixte Mbarushimana, Mathieu Ngudjolo 
Chui, and Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta were all charged with the 
crime against humanity of rape under Article 7(1)(g) of the 
Rome Statute.50 Chui was also charged with the crime of sexual 
slavery.51 
There are currently three cases that are at the trial stage 
at the ICC, all involving men from Africa and one of which in-
volving witness tampering in a case at the ICC. Bosco 
Ntaganda has been accused of war crimes and crimes against 
humanity directed at the non-Hema civilian population in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo.52 Laurent Gbagbo and 
Charles Blé Goudé have been charged with murder, rape, at-
tempted murder, and persecution for actions taken in Côte 
d’Ivoire.53 Importantly, the ICC has taken up two cases involv-
ing individuals charged with gendered crimes committed 
 
 49. INT’L CRIMINAL COURT, CASE INFORMATION SHEET: SITUATION IN 
DARFUR, SUDAN, THE PROSECUTOR V. BAHAR IDRISS ABU GARDA, ICC-02/05-
02/09 (2012), https://www.icc-cpi.int/darfur/abugarda/Documents/AbuGarda 
Eng.pdf; INT’L CRIMINAL COURT, CASE INFORMATION SHEET: SITUATION IN THE 
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO, THE PROSECUTOR V. CALLIXTE 
MBARUSHIMANA, ICC-01/04-01/10 (2012) [hereinafter MBARUSHIMANA], 
https://www.icc-cpi.int/drc/mbarushimana/Documents/MbarushimanaEng 
.pdf; INT’L CRIMINAL COURT, CASE INFORMATION SHEET: SITUATION IN THE 
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO, THE PROSECUTOR V. MATHIEU 
NGUDJOLO CHUI, ICC-01/04-02/12 (2015) [hereinafter CHUI], https://www.icc 
-cpi.int/drc/ngudjolo/Documents/ChuiEng.pdf; INT’L CRIMINAL COURT, CASE 
INFORMATION SHEET: SITUATION IN THE REPUBLIC OF KENYA, THE PROSECU-
TOR V. UHURU MUIGAI KENYATTA, ICC-01/09-02/11 (2015) [hereinafter 
KENYATTA], https://www.icc-cpi.int/kenya/kenyatta/Documents/KenyattaEng 
.pdf; INT’L CRIMINAL COURT, CASE INFORMATION SHEET: SITUATION IN THE 
REPUBLIC OF KENYA, THE PROSECUTOR V. WILLIAM SAMOEI RUTO AND JOSHUA 
ARAP SANG, ICC-01/09-01/11 (2016), https://www.icc-cpi.int/kenya/rutosang/ 
Documents/RutoSangEng.pdf. 
 50. CHUI, supra note 49, at 1; KENYATTA, supra note 49, at 1; 
MBARUSHIMANA, supra note 49, at 1. 
 51. CHUI, supra note 49, at 1. 
 52. INT’L CRIMINAL COURT, CASE INFORMATION SHEET: SITUATION IN THE 
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO, THE PROSECUTOR V. BOSCO 
NTAGANDA, ICC-01/04-02/06 1 (2015), https://www.icc-cpi.int/drc/ntaganda/ 
Documents/NtagandaEng.pdf. 
 53. INT’L CRIMINAL COURT, CASE INFORMATION SHEET: SITUATION IN 
CÔTE D’IVOIRE, THE PROSECUTOR V. LAURENT GBAGBO AND CHARLES BLÉ 
GOUDÉ, ICC-02/11-01/15 1–2 (2015), https://www.icc-cpi.int/cdi/gbagbo-goude/ 
Documents/LaurentGbagboandBleGoudeEng.pdf. 
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against women belonging to specific ethnic groups.54 Both cases 
are at the pre-trial stage while the subjects of the cases remain 
at large.55 
As can be seen by the above, the ICC has had limited op-
portunities to explore the Rome Statute’s definition of “gender” 
and certainly has not had occasion to consider whether the 
LGBT community falls within that definition. As will be dis-
cussed below, because of the lack of precedents from the ICC 
and the uncertainty surrounding the definition of “gender,” it is 
appropriate that the ICC consult the practices of international 
human rights courts.56 
3. The Pertinent Language of the Rome Statute 
The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court was 
completed when negotiations finished on July 17, 199857 and 
was designed to “establish an independent permanent Interna-
tional Criminal Court in relationship with the [U]nited Nations 
system, with jurisdiction over the most serious crimes of con-
cern to the international community as a whole.”58 Currently, 
there are 124 countries that are parties to the Rome Statute 
and thus subject to its provisions.59 Article 7 of the Rome Stat-
ute states that persecution on account of one’s religion, ethnici-
ty, or membership in another “universally recognized” group 
can be prosecuted.60 Gender is one of the groups that is protect-
 
 54. INT’L CRIMINAL COURT, CASE INFORMATION SHEET: SITUATION IN 
DARFUR, SUDAN, THE PROSECUTOR V. AHMAD MUHAMMAD HARUN (“AHMAD 
HARUN”) AND ALI MUHAMMAD ALI ABD-AL-RAHMAN (“ALI KUSHAYB”), ICC-
02/05-01/07 (2015) [hereinafter HARUN & KUSHAYB], https://www.icc-cpi.int/ 
darfur/harunkushayb/Documents/HarunKushaybEng.pdf; INT’L CRIMINAL 
COURT, CASE INFORMATION SHEET: SITUATION IN DARFUR, SUDAN, THE PROS-
ECUTOR V. OMAR HASSAN AHMAD AL BASHIR, ICC-02/05-01/09 (2015) [herein-
after AL BASHIR], https://www.icc-cpi.int/darfur/albashir/Documents/ 
AlBashirEng.pdf. 
 55. AL BASHIR, supra note 54, at 1; HARUN & KUSHAYB, supra note 54, at 
1. 
 56. See infra Part II.C. 
 57. Mahnoush H. Arsanjani, The Rome Statute of the International Crim-
inal Court, 93 AM. J. INT’L L. 22, 22 (1999). 
 58. Rome Statute, supra note 1, pmbl. 
 59. The States Parties to the Rome Statute, INT’L CRIM. CT., https://asp.icc 
-cpi.int/en_menus/asp/states%20parties/Pages/the%20states%20parties%20to 
%20the%20rome%20statute.aspx (last visited Nov. 28, 2016). Of the 124 sig-
natories, 34 are from Africa, 19 from Asia, 43 from Europe, and 28 from Latin 
America and the Caribbean. Id. Notably missing from the list of signatories 
are the United States, China, India, and Turkey. Id. 
 60. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 7(1)(h). 
  
2017] EMBRACING AMBIGUITY 1299 
 
ed by this provision, but the Rome Statute refers to Article 7(3), 
which defines gender in the following manner: “the two sexes, 
male and female, within the context of society. The term ‘gen-
der’ does not indicate any meaning different from the above.”61 
The “universally recognized” designation indicates that there is 
a high standard that must be met in order to even determine 
that a social group exists and is thus worthy of protection un-
der the Rome Statute, as compared to other references in the 
treaty to “internationally recognized” groups or norms.62 
4. The Lingering Question of “Gender” 
On its face, the above language does not seem to cover mal-
treatment of the LGBT population. The fact that the definition 
of “gender” states that it does not “indicate any meaning differ-
ent from the above” could be understood to mean that it does 
not refer to mean anything other than male or female.63 How-
ever, while the Rome Statute states that the definition shall 
not have any other meaning, the meaning that is extracted 
from the definition itself is still quite unclear, while also leav-
ing room for an interpretation that covers the LGBT communi-
ty. 
The ICC has made clear that sexual orientation is not a 
group that fits under the genocide heading;64 therefore if prose-
cution will ever take place, it must be under the Article 7 
“crimes against humanity” umbrella. In order to understand 
how sexual orientation as a protected group may fit within the 
parameters of Article 7, the text and its history must be ex-
plored further. 
 
 61. Id. art. 7(3). 
 62. See infra Part I.E. 
 63. Oosterveld, supra note 15, at 57. 
 64. The idea of expanding the definition of “genocide” was explicitly con-
sidered during the negotiations of the Rome Statute; however, it was decided 
that expanding the definition to include other groups would only serve to cre-
ate controversy. Alycia T. Feindel, Reconciling Sexual Orientation: Creating a 
Definition of Genocide That Includes Sexual Orientation, 13 MICH. ST. J. INT’L 
L. 197, 213 (2005). The ICC has since made clear that the crime of genocide is 
not expanded to any additional groups. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Al Bashir, Case 
No. ICC-02/05-01/09, Decision on the Prosecution’s Application for a Warrant 
of Arrest against Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir ¶ 114 (Mar. 4, 2009) (“The 
Majority highlights that the crime of genocide is characterised by the fact that 
it targets a specific national, ethnic, racial or religious group.”). 
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C. THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE ROME STATUTE 
Although the negotiations surrounding the definition of 
“gender” were contentious, they produced a definition that pro-
vides adequate ambiguity to allow for an argument that the 
LGBT community is protected. Subsection 1 details the negoti-
ations that led to the formulation of “gender” under the Rome 
Statute; Subsection 2 presents the criticisms of the resultant 
definition; and Subsection 3 explains why that definition still 
provides flexibility. 
1. The Debate over the Definition of “Gender” in the Rome 
Statute 
The definition of “gender” included in the Rome Statute 
was the result of intense negotiations between sides with in-
compatible views. The contradictions within the definition of 
gender are a reflection of the opposing sides that negotiated the 
definition: women advocacy groups on one side, and the Vati-
can, Arab League states, and conservative organizations on the 
other side.65 The word “gender” made its first appearance with-
in the provisions on crimes against humanity as a prohibited 
ground upon which persecution could be committed in Febru-
ary 1997.66 The introduction of the term concerned many par-
ties that its inclusion would leave open the possibility that sex-
ual orientation would be a protected ground upon which one 
could be persecuted.67 The Vatican, several Arab states, and 
some conservative North American organizations made an at-
tempt to remove the word “gender” completely from the Rome 
Statute during negotiations.68 That conservative coalition 
worked to eliminate the word “gender” entirely not only be-
cause of concerns that sexual orientation would be a protected 
group but also because the term evoked thoughts of gender 
roles and each genders’ place in society, considerations that 
these groups sought to exclude from the protection of the Rome 
Statute.69 
 
 65. See Rhonda Copelon, Gender Crimes as War Crimes: Integrating 
Crimes Against Women into International Criminal Law, 46 MCGILL L.J. 217, 
233 (2000). 
 66. Oosterveld, supra note 15, at 59. 
 67. Joydeep Sengupta, How the UN Can Advance Gay Rights, GAY & LES-
BIAN REV., Nov.–Dec. 2003, at 32. 
 68. Id. 
 69. See Copelon, supra note 65, at 236. 
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Some negotiators thought that the Rome Statute should 
simply adopt the United Nations (UN) definition of “gender.”70 
The UN definition, although it varies slightly across the many 
institutions within the organization, has three crucial ele-
ments: (1) gender is a socially constructed concept; (2) it is in-
fluenced by culture, the roles of each sex, and the value a par-
ticular culture places on the sexes fitting into those roles; and 
(3) the definition of “gender” varies depending on the time and 
place.71 However, the conservative coalition opposed this view 
because they feared it could be interpreted to mean that laws 
outlawing homosexuality would be criminal.72 
Rather, the conservative coalition advocated for the use of 
the term “sex” instead of “gender” because “sex” would be un-
derstood to mean simply the biological differences between men 
and women.73 There was considerable pushback on this view 
because of a feeling that the definition needed to include socio-
logical elements in order to be “an accurate reflection of the 
current state of international law.”74 The UN, for example, had 
used the word “gender” for that very reason: because it encom-
passed both the biological meaning and sociological ones.75 
The view that the term “gender” ought to be utilized pre-
vailed, but there was continued concern that homosexuality 
would be a protected ground under this definition.76 Ultimately, 
the wording “within the context of society” was included in or-
der to satisfy both sides that there was some flexibility while 
still maintaining a degree of precision.77 That precision origi-
nated from the 1995 Beijing Declaration and Platform for Ac-
 
 70. LEILA NADYA SADAT, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT AND THE 
TRANSFORMATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: JUSTICE FOR THE NEW MILLENNI-
UM 159 (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 2002). 
 71. Oosterveld, supra note 15, at 67–70. 
 72. SADAT, supra note 70. 
 73. Cate Steains, Gender Issues, in THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
COURT: THE MAKING OF THE ROME STATUTE 357, 373 (Roy S. Lee ed., 1999). 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. at 374. 
 77. Id. 
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tion78 in which the word “gender” was used in the “ordinary, 
generally accepted” way.79 
The result of these negotiations is what is included in the 
Rome Statute: “[T]he term ‘gender’ refers to the two sexes, male 
and female, within the context of society. The term ‘gender’ 
does not indicate any meaning different from the above.”80 This 
was the only definition that could be negotiated that would sat-
isfy both sides of the debate, and the coalition of Arab states 
made clear that this was the only definition they would ac-
cept.81 In the end, “[t]he reference to ‘the two sexes, male and 
female’ was a concession to The Vatican, while the reference to 
gender ‘within the context of society’ was a concession to wom-
en’s groups, who wanted to include as fluid a concept, and as 
many iterations, of the term gender as possible.”82 Although the 
controversy surrounding this definition has served as a possible 
barrier to prosecuting persecutors of the LGBT community, 
there continues to be flexibility in how this definition will be 
used and it is this elasticity that also opens the door to future 
prosecution.83 
2. The Criticisms of the Definition of “Gender” Under the 
Rome Statute 
On its face, the definition of “gender” found in the Rome 
Statute may be, possibly deliberately, “the most puzzling and 
bizarre language ever included in an international treaty.”84 
 
 78. The goal of the Beijing Declaration was to “advance the goals of equal-
ity, development and peace for all women everywhere in the interest of all 
humanity . . . .” Fourth World Conference on Women, Report of the Fourth 
World Conference on Women, resolution 1, annex I ¶ 3, U.N. Doc. 
A/CONF.177/20/Rev.1 (1995). 
 79. United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Es-
tablishment of an International Criminal Court, Working Paper on Article 20, 
Paragraph 3, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/C.1/WGAL/L.3 (July 13, 1998). 
 80. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 7(3). 
 81. Steains, supra note 73, at 374–75. 
 82. Brian Kritz, The Global Transgender Population and the International 
Criminal Court, 17 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 1, 36 (2014). 
 83. It is this flexibility that has been at the middle of the controversy 
which serves as the subject of this Note. Although the ICC has not yet prose-
cuted a persecutor of the LGBT community, the door has remained open for 
such prosecution to take place in the future. This Note advocates for the use of 
the current language of the Rome Statute as a means for empowering OTP to 
prosecute such individuals in the future. See infra Part III. 
 84. Rosemary Grey, Hate Crime Against Humanity? Persecution on the 
Grounds of Sexual Orientation Under the Rome Statute, BEYOND THE HAGUE 
(Feb. 21, 2014), http://www.beyondthehague.com/2014/02/21/hate-crime 
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However, the criticism extends beyond the confusion behind the 
definition. Valerie Oosterveld, who has commented extensively 
on how the Rome Statute interacts with gender-based crimes, 
points to four distinct criticisms of the definition of “gender” 
under the Rome Statute.85 Beyond acknowledging the contro-
versy addressed by this Note, whether the LGBT community is 
covered under the definition, Oosterveld states that the prima-
ry concerns with the definition are that: (1) the terms “gender” 
and “sex” have mistakenly been made interchangeable by some 
readers of the Rome Statute; (2) the reference to “within the 
context of society” may be limited in its application; and (3) 
gender issues may not be promoted as a result of this defini-
tion.86 Others have noted that there is a clear distinction be-
tween male and female and those who identify with both sexes 
or neither may not be protected.87 Additionally, Brian Kritz, 
who has explored the treatment of transgendered individuals 
by the Rome Statute, points out that the “within the context of 
society” language seems to provide at least an argument that 
cultures wherein certain sexual preferences may not be main-
stream are not subjected to this provision.88 
3. This Definition Maintains Flexibility 
Because of the opposing views involved in the negotiations, 
what is left is a definition that seems contradictory on one hand 
and flexible on the other. It is important to note that since Arti-
cle 120 of the Rome Statute prohibits reservations from the 
treaty, this definition applies to all signatories.89 What makes 
the definition of “gender” so flexible is the fact that although 
“the compromise[d] language employed . . . was crafted to ap-
pease two irreconcilable points of view, both sides may assert 
that the definition as adopted reflects their understanding of 
 
-against-humanity-persecution-on-the-grounds-of-sexual-orientation-under 
-the-rome-statute (citing Oosterveld, supra note 15, at 56 n.4). 
 85. Oosterveld, supra note 15, at 71. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Kritz, supra note 82, at 36–37. 
 88. Id. 
 89. See Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 120 (“No reservations may be 
made to this Statute.”). For a discussion of statements that realistically 
amount to a reservation (none of which involve the definition of “gender”), see 
generally International Criminal Court: Declarations Amounting to Prohibited 
Reservations to the Rome Statute, AMNESTY INT’L (Nov. 24, 2005), https://www 
.amnesty.org/en/documents/IOR40/032/2005/en. 
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the term.”90 Indeed, there are those that have suggested that 
this constructive ambiguity was employed intentionally to re-
solve these “irreconcilable” viewpoints.91 Those in support of in-
cluding sexual orientation within the meaning of gender will 
emphasize not only that the term “gender” was utilized because 
of its broader application, but also that “within the context of 
society” makes clear that sociological considerations are part of 
the definition.92 Those on the other side will argue that the def-
inition makes clear that it refers only to the male/female dis-
tinction.93 Yet, because of its seeming inconsistency, the defini-
tion “effectively leaves the term open for the future Court to 
interpret and apply to the circumstances before it, as appropri-
ate.”94 
D. ELEMENTS NEEDED TO PROSECUTE UNDER THE ROME 
STATUTE 
In order to more fully understand what is required to prove 
a case in front of the ICC, it is necessary that the elements of 
prosecution be highlighted. After satisfying the admissibility 
criteria under Article 17,95 there are specific elements for each 
particular crime that must be met. The first element under Ar-
ticle 7(1)(h) is “[t]he perpetrator [must have] severely deprived 
. . . one or more persons of fundamental rights.”96 Next, a prose-
cutor would be required to demonstrate that the persecutor 
targeted individuals because of their membership in the group 
and that the targeting was based on their political, racial, na-
tional, ethnic, cultural, religious, or gender affiliation, or other 
grounds that are “universally recognized.”97 The conduct itself 
must have been committed in conjunction with any act referred 
 
 90. SADAT, supra note 70, at 160. 
 91. Valerie Oosterveld, Constructive Ambiguity and the Meaning of “Gen-
der” for the International Criminal Court, 16 INT’L FEMINIST J. POL. 563, 564 
(2014) (suggesting that the resulting language is the product of “a tactic used 
by diplomats and other negotiators . . . to adopt indefinite language to seem-
ingly resolve disparate points of view”). 
 92. Oosterveld, supra note 15, at 65 (“While an unusual solution, [the def-
inition of ‘gender’] . . . reaffirmed the valuable sociological reference to ‘context 
of society.’”). 
 93. See infra Part II.B. 
 94. Steains, supra note 73, at 374. 
 95. See supra Part I.B.1. 
 96. ASSEMBLY OF STATES PARTIES TO THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTER-
NATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, at 122, ICC Doc. ICC-ASP/1/3, U.N. Sales No. 
E.03.V.2 (2011) [hereinafter ASSEMBLY OF STATES]. 
 97. Id. 
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to in Article 7 (such as rape, murder, torture, etc.)98 or any 
crime within the jurisdiction of the ICC, such as a war crime or 
the crime of genocide.99 The acts themselves must have been 
part of a “widespread or systematic attack directed against a 
civilian population.”100 Last, there must be a showing that the 
perpetrator knew or intended for the conduct to be part of a 
“widespread or systematic attack.”101 
It is worth noting that there are no elements for the defini-
tion of gender.102 Therefore, what is left for advocates and oppo-
nents to argue over is simply the definition itself; there is no 
guidance from the ICC on what ultimately will satisfy the 
meaning of “gender” under Article 7. 
E. WHY PROSECUTION CANNOT HAPPEN UNDER THE 
“UNIVERSALLY RECOGNIZED” PORTION OF ARTICLE 7 
Article 7 of the Rome Statute does allow for a degree of 
flexibility in determining which groups are protected, by stat-
ing that in addition to the enumerated groups, any group that 
is “universally recognized” will also be protected.103 Although at 
first glance this seems to provide a carve-out in the Rome Stat-
ute for groups such as the LGBT community to be brought un-
der the protection of the ICC, the “universally recognized” 
standard seems to imply a high burden that this group would 
not be able to meet.104 This language is the only reference to a 
 
 98. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 7(1). 
 99. ASSEMBLY OF STATES, supra note 96, at 122. 
 100. ASSEMBLY OF STATES, supra note 96. “[T]he term ‘widespread’ con-
notes the large-scale nature of the attack, which should be massive, frequent, 
carried out collectively with considerable seriousness and directed against a 
multiplicity of victims. It entails an attack carried out over a large geograph-
ical area or an attack in a small geographical area directed against a large 
number of civilians. The underlying offences must also not be isolated.” Prose-
cutor v. Gombo, ICC-01/05-01/08, Decision Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) 
of the Rome Statute on the Charges of the Prosecutor Against Jean-Pierre 
Bemba Gombo, ¶ 83 (June 15, 2009) (citations omitted). 
 101. Id. 
 102. In fact, the only places that gender is mentioned within the Elements 
of Crimes is to say that within the context of rape, “invasion” is a gender-
neutral term that can be applied to both males and females. See id. at 119, 
n.15. 
 103. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 7(1)(h). 
 104. See George E. Edwards, International Human Rights Law Challenges 
to the New International Criminal Court: The Search and Seizure Right to Pri-
vacy, 2 YALE J. INT’L L. 323, 377 (2001) (explaining that “universally recog-
nized is more narrow a category than the alternative “internationally recog-
nized” category). 
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“universally recognized” set of rights or groups in the entire 
treaty, whereas other parts of the Rome Statute acknowledge 
that there are “internationally recognized human rights” and 
“internationally recognized norms and standards.”105 This pro-
vision could have stated that these groups must be “interna-
tionally recognized” rather than “universally recognized,” and 
the language utilized suggests that there is a higher threshold 
for proving that a group is “universally recognized.”106 
By seemingly increasing the burden of proof required for a 
group to be considered “universally recognized,” it appears as 
though the Rome Statute requires that the protection of such a 
group be at least a jus cogens norm in order for the Rome Stat-
ute to treat them as such. A jus cogens norm, also referred to as 
a peremptory norm, “is a norm accepted and recognized by the 
international community of States as a whole as a norm from 
which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified 
only by a subsequent norm of general international law having 
the same character.”107 In other words, this is a standard that 
all states have acknowledged exists and is one that all states 
are compelled to follow.108 In order for a norm to ripen into jus 
cogens, it must be a practice that has become “more or less uni-
form” and states have behaved in this manner out of a feeling 
that they have a “legal obligation” to do so.109 
If this is the proper reading of this provision of Article 7, 
then it is highly unlikely that the LGBT population can be pro-
tected under this language. The LGBT community itself has 
not received recognition to the level that their protection can be 
considered a jus cogens norm; as there are states that have yet 
to realize full equality for homosexuals and transgendered in-
dividuals, it is clear that their dignity has yet to receive uni-
form treatment. The mere fact that several states still criminal-
ize homosexual conduct in and of itself indicates non-
uniformity of this protection principle.110 Therefore, the only av-
enue toward protecting members of the LGBT community must 
go through the Rome Statute’s definition of “gender.” 
 
 105. See, e.g., Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 21(1)(c), art. 21(3). 
 106. Id. 
 107. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 53, May 23, 1969, 
K.A.V. 2424. 
 108. See id. 
 109. MARK WESTON JANIS, INTERNATIONAL LAW 48 (6th ed. 2012). 
 110. See supra note 11 and accompanying text. 
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F. HOW THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY GENERALLY AND 
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS COURTS SPECIFICALLY HAVE 
PROTECTED THE LGBT COMMUNITY 
As has been demonstrated above, the Rome Statute pro-
vides a singular route by which the ICC can protect members of 
the LGBT community using the definition of “gender.” Interna-
tional human rights courts have made this move already as 
both the ECHR and the IACHR have addressed cases involving 
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. The interna-
tional community in general has also seen a movement towards 
a protection of these rights. Those courts’ case law is addressed 
in detail below, looking first to the ECHR in Subsection 1 and 
the IACHR in Subsection 2. Subsection 3 briefly touches on de-
velopments in the international community as a whole, show-
ing a trend towards respecting the rights of the LGBT commu-
nity. 
1. The European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) 
The ECHR has protected members of the LGBT communi-
ty in several different scenarios and its reasoning could certain-
ly apply with equal force to the ICC. ECHR’s recognition of the 
nature of discrimination against the LGBT community and its 
understanding of an emerging right to sexual choice has in-
formed its jurisprudence.111 By examining several ECHR cases 
below and demonstrating the interconnectedness of the roles of 
the ECHR and the ICC,112 it becomes apparent that the ICC 
ought to look to the ECHR for guidance on this issue. 
In general, the ECHR has protected members of the LGBT 
community under Article 14 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights, which touches on discrimination.113 By invoking 
 
 111. See PAUL JOHNSON, HOMOSEXUALITY AND THE EUROPEAN COURT OF 
HUMAN RIGHTS 89 (2013) (“[T]he [ECHR] has adopted a particular ontological 
understanding of homosexuality and this has underpinned the progressive de-
velopment of its case law through which it has narrowed the margin of appre-
ciation available to states in respect of certain discriminatory practices. . . . 
The Court’s methods have not, therefore, precluded it from issuing strong con-
demnations of practices that maintain inequalities on the ground of sexual 
orientation.”). 
 112. See infra Part II.C. 
 113. See European Convention on Human Rights art. 14, Dec. 10, 1948, 213 
U.N.T.S. 232 (“The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this Con-
vention shall be secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, 
race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social 
origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or status.”). 
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its discrimination provision, while also coupling it with Article 
8, which protects the “right to respect for . . . private and family 
life,”114 the ECHR found in favor of a Polish national who had 
been evicted from his home because of his sexual orientation.115 
The ECHR took into consideration developments in society “in-
cluding the fact that there [was] not just one way or one choice 
in the sphere of leading and living one’s private life” and re-
fused to accept that “a blanket exclusion of persons living in a 
homosexual relationship from succession to a tenancy . . . as 
necessary for the protection of the family.”116 The ECHR, there-
fore, found protection for this homosexual man by finding that 
there had been “a violation of Article 14 taken in conjunction 
with Article 8.”117 
In other cases, the ECHR has found that there has been a 
violation of a specific right and found that the violation, in tan-
dem with discrimination, was enough to find the state guilty, 
much like is required in the Rome Statute.118 In X v. Turkey, 
the ECHR found that a man who had been placed in solitary 
confinement out of concern that he, as a homosexual, would be 
harmed by other inmates had suffered a violation of the 
ECHR’s torture provisions.119 However, more generally, the 
ECHR stated that discrimination “based solely on . . . sexual 
orientation . . . would amount to discrimination” by itself and 
that “sexual orientation attracts the protection of Article 14,” 
 
 114. Id. art. 8. 
 115. Kozak v. Poland, Eur. Ct. H.R., (2010), http://www.hudoc.echr.coe.int/ 
eng?i=001-97597. 
 116. Id.; see also Press Release, Registrar of the Court, European Court of 
Human Rights, Repeated Unjustified Ban on Gay-Rights Marches in Moscow 
(Oct. 21, 2010) (on file with author) (describing the court’s decision in 
Alekseyev v. Russia: “[W]hile no European consensus had been reached on 
questions of adoption by or marriage between homosexual people, ample case 
law had shown the existence of a long-standing European consensus on ques-
tions such as the abolition of criminal liability for homosexual relations be-
tween adults, on homosexuals’ access to service in the armed forces, to the 
granting of parental rights, to equality in tax matters and the right to succeed 
to the deceased partner’s tenancy. It was also clear that other Convention 
member States recognised the right of people to openly identify themselves as 
gay and to promote their rights and freedoms, in particular by peacefully and 
publicly gathering together.”). 
 117. Kozak v. Poland, Eur. Ct. H.R., (2010), http://www.hudoc.echr.coe.int/ 
eng?i=001-97597. 
 118. See X v. Turkey, Eur. Ct. H.R., (2012), http://www.hudoc.echr.coe.int/ 
eng?i=001-113876. 
 119. See id.; European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 113, art. 
3. 
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the discrimination provision of the European Convention on 
Human Rights.120 
Not only does the growing support for the protection of the 
LGBT community within legal institutions demonstrate that 
the ICC ought to protect this group, a comparison of the trea-
ties of the ICC and ECHR demonstrates that similar principles 
could be applied in the chambers of the ICC. ECHR found room 
for protection of the LGBT community under its discrimination 
provision despite the fact that this article only mentions “sex” 
as a protected group and not “gender.”121 It appears as though 
the ECHR determined that the LGBT community fell under the 
more restrictive term of “sex.”122 The ECHR performed a similar 
analysis in the Kozak and X cases than what would be seen in 
the ICC: only after identifying specific enumerated, prohibited 
conduct under which the victim had been wronged were the de-
fendants found to have violated the ECHR’s provision on dis-
crimination.123 
However, one important difference between cases brought 
to the ECHR and those heard by the ICC is the fact that cases 
can be brought to the ECHR by citizens.124 Yet, this difference 
does not point to a glaring flaw of the Rome Statute, only a dif-
ference of the roles of the two courts. Instead, this variation in 
the ICC’s functioning only serves to reinforce the thesis of this 
Note: OTP must act to bring crimes against humanity cases 
committed against members of the LGBT community to the 
ICC. Because such cases cannot be flagged by injured individu-
als, the ICC has a duty to protect these individuals by using its 
resources to investigate and prosecute those who have commit-
ted crimes against humanity against the LGBT community.125 
 
 120. X v. Turkey, Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶ 50 (2012), http://www.hudoc.echr.coe 
.int/eng?i=001-113876. 
 121. See European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 113, art. 14. 
 122. It is doubtful that the ECHR would find that the LGBT community 
fell under the categorization of the other protected groups: “[R]ace, colour, lan-
guage, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association 
with a national minority, property, birth, or other status.” Id. Thus, simple 
logic would seem to indicate that the ECHR chose to include “homosexual” un-
der the “sex” heading of the treaty. 
 123. See X v. Turkey, Eur. Ct. H.R., (2012), http://www.hudoc.echr.coe.int/ 
eng?i=001-113876; Kozak v. Poland, Eur. Ct. H.R., (2010), http://www.hudoc 
.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-97597. 
 124. European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 113, art. 25 (“The 
Commission may receive petitions . . . from any person . . . claiming to be the 
victim of a violation . . . .”). 
 125. See Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 21 (“The application and inter-
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2. The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 
(IACHR) 
The IACHR has found that mistreatment of homosexuals 
constitutes a violation of Article 11, which relates to an indi-
vidual’s right to privacy.126 In the Giraldo case, the court found 
that a prisoner’s right to privacy had been violated when her 
request for an intimate visit in prison was denied, in violation 
of Colombian law, because she was a homosexual.127 The Co-
lombian government’s argument that the denial was appropri-
ate because of a “deeply rooted intolerance in Latin American 
culture of homosexual practices” was denied.128 Article 11 of the 
Inter-American Convention on Human Rights, which was used 
as the basis upon which the petitioner was protected, relates to 
privacy and protects three distinct rights: (1) an individual’s 
honor and dignity; (2) the right of an individual to not “be the 
object of arbitrary or abusive interference with his private life”; 
and that (3) all individuals have the right to be protected by the 
law from such “interference or attacks.”129 This case makes 
clear that homosexuals cannot be discriminated against under 
the Inter-American Convention on Human Rights and cultural 
relativity cannot be used as a means by which one can argue 
that these provisions do not apply. 
3. Developing Trends in the International Community in 
General 
Since the time the Rome Statute was negotiated in the late 
1990s, there have been considerable developments in the inter-
national community on the treatment of gays and lesbians. In 
considering the rights of transgender individuals in the ICC, 
Brian Kritz points to many developments that indicate greater 
acceptance internationally for the rights of members of the 
LGBT community.130 Specifically, Kritz notes countries like Ma-
 
pretation of law pursuant to this article must be . . . without any adverse dis-
tinction founded on grounds such as gender as defined in article 7, paragraph 
3, age, race, colour, language, religion or belief, political or other opinion, na-
tional, ethnic or social origin, wealth, birth or other status.”). 
 126. Giraldo v. Colombia, Case 11.656, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 
71/99, OEA/Ser.L./V/II.106, doc. 3 rev. ¶ 21 (1999). 
 127. Id. ¶ 6. 
 128. Id. ¶ 12. 
 129. Inter-American Convention on Human Rights art. 11, Nov. 22, 1969, 
1144 U.N.T.S. 123. 
 130. Kritz, supra note 82, at 1. 
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lawi and Colombia have made significant steps towards pro-
moting the dignity of the LGBT communities within their re-
spective borders.131 However, the most impactful movement 
from the international community is likely the UN Resolution 
on Human Rights, Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity.132 
The UN noted crimes of violence that have occurred against 
members of the LGBT community and recognized that the UN 
has an obligation to “promot[e] universal respect for the protec-
tion of all human rights and fundamental freedoms for all, 
without distinction of any kind and in a fair and equal man-
ner.”133 Yet, this step does not obviate the need for progress 
within the ICC; despite the passage of this resolution (by a slim 
margin no less, with nineteen countries voting against the pro-
posal),134 violations against the LGBT community still continue 
such that the ICC must step in hold persecutors accountable. 
* * * * * 
As has been demonstrated above, the definition of “gender” 
found in the Rome Statue was the result of a series of conten-
tious negotiations and does not, on its face, appear to protect 
members of the LGBT community. Yet, this route seems to pre-
sent the only possible opportunity by which the ICC can protect 
members of this vulnerable population. The definition em-
ployed by the treaty maintains a degree of flexibility and by 
looking to the work of other international institutions, a devel-
oping trend of protecting the rights of the LGBT community be-
comes apparent. Both the momentum in the international sys-
tem as well as the definition at the disposal of the ICC can be 
utilized to prosecute persecutors of LGBT populations. While 
this Note establishes that the debate over the meaning of “gen-
der” under the Rome Statute continues, it explores how sexual 
orientation fits into this framework, concludes that the LGBT 
community is covered under the definition, and proposes that 
 
 131. See id. 
 132. Human Rights Council, Res. 17/19, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/17/19 (July 
14, 2011). 
 133. Id. This language is similar to the language found in Article 21(3) of 
the Rome Statute, directing the ICC to apply only law that makes no “adverse 
distinction” among protected groups. See id. 
 134. See id. Angola, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Cameroon, Djibouti, Gabon, 
Ghana, Jordan, Malaysia, Maldives, Mauritania, Moldova, Nigeria, Pakistan, 
Qatar, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, and Uganda all voted against the pro-
posal, with Burkina Faso, China, and Zambia abstaining from the vote. Id. 
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the approaches of other international institutions can inform 
the processes of the ICC. 
II.  INTERPRETATION OF THE ROME STATUTE’S 
DEFINITION OF GENDER AND EMPLOYING THE 
AMBIGUITY THEREIN   
By analyzing the definition of “gender” in the Rome Stat-
ute, the criticisms become exceedingly clear. These criticisms 
all lead to the same conclusion: the application of the definition 
of “gender” beyond the male and female distinction remains 
unsettled. Yet, it is because this issue has not yet been resolved 
that allows one to argue that the LGBT community does in fact 
fit under this definition. While there are those that argue they 
do not, the arguments in the other direction hold more weight. 
An explanation of the criticisms of the definition135 and how the 
social construction of gender fits into this discussion136 both 
make clear that sexual orientation can be comprehended under 
the current formulation of “gender” found in the Rome Statute. 
Although the definition certainly evokes a wide range of reac-
tions, it is important to note that the definition did not close the 
door on including members of the LGBT community. This flexi-
bility and ambiguity are both tools that can be used in order to 
advocate that the ICC look to approaches by international hu-
man rights courts for guidance. 
In this Part, the ambiguity of the definition of “gender” is 
further analyzed. Section A discusses the flexibility of the defi-
nition and demonstrates that the question of whether or not 
the LGBT community falls within this definition is one left un-
answered. Next, Section B addresses arguments that some 
have advanced stating that the definition of “gender” precludes 
the idea that the LGBT community falls within its bounds. 
However, this Note rejects those arguments while also demon-
strating that sexual preference indeed does fall under the “gen-
der” heading. Finally, Section C establishes that, although hu-
man rights courts have a different function than the ICC, it is 
appropriate for the ICC to consider their jurisprudence on per-
secution of individuals on the basis of sexual orientation. 
 
 135. See supra Part I.C.2. 
 136. See infra Part II.B.2. 
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A. THE APPLICABLE MEANING OF THE DEFINITION OF “GENDER” 
IS STILL AN OPEN QUESTION 
In spite of the criticism of the definition of “gender,”137 and 
indeed highlighted by it, the meaning of the Rome Statute’s 
definition of “gender” is one that allows for considerable conjec-
ture as to whether the LGBT community falls under its protec-
tion. Unsurprisingly, the definition of “gender” produced by the 
negotiations of the Rome Statute has received widespread criti-
cism because of its inherent inconsistencies as well as because 
of its seemingly narrow application.138 It is this uncertainty that 
enables one to make the argument that members of the LGBT 
community who have been the targets of crimes against hu-
manity can be protected under Article 7 of the Rome Statute.139 
First, it is important to recall that the negotiations of the 
Rome Statute ultimately employed the term “gender” precisely 
because of its broader application beyond the simple male and 
female distinction.140 By not using the term “sex,” the ICC has 
implicitly acknowledged the “well-established practice of using 
[a] broader concept in international instruments.”141 The term 
“sex” could be understood to refer only to the biological differ-
ences between men and women, but the use of “gender” seems 
to acknowledge the social construction of gender roles.142 
In fact, OTP has given guidance that indicates the office 
will specifically consider such non-biological meanings.143 The 
first such indication can be found in OTP’s own definition of 
 
 137. See supra Part I.C.2. 
 138. See supra Part I.C.2. 
 139. Contra Bohlander, supra note 11, at 409 (“[I]t appears unconvincing to 
assume that the drafters engaged in a conspiratorial exercise of ‘constructive 
ambiguity’ with the intention of leaving the door open to the ICC judges to in-
terpret a wider meaning into the term ‘gender’ in Art. 7(3) . . . .”). However, 
rather than this disagreement meaning that the language specifically excludes 
protection of the LGBT community, it simply led to a more open-ended defini-
tion. What was achieved was an entirely ambiguous and divided definition. 
This ambiguity does not by itself preclude reinterpretation. 
 140. See Steains, supra note 73. 
 141. Barbara Bedont & Katherine Hall-Martinez, Ending Impunity for 
Gender Crimes Under the International Criminal Court, 6 BROWN J. WORLD 
AFF. 65, 68 (1999). 
 142. See Margaret McAuliffe deGuzman, Article 21: Applicable Law, in 
COMMENTARY ON THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
COURT 701, 712 (Otto Triffterer ed., 2d ed. 1999). 
 143. See generally OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR, supra note 3 passim (stat-
ing repeatedly that the “social construction” of gender is inherent in any con-
sideration of the term). 
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“gender-based crimes,” which states that this category of crimes 
includes acts “committed against persons, whether male or fe-
male, because of their sex and/or socially constructed gender 
roles.”144 Not only does this statement recognize the difference 
between the terms “sex” and “gender,” it makes explicit that 
OTP will consider variations of gender that transcend the 
realm of biology. To go a step further, OTP has acknowledged 
that there are valuable precedents that can be borrowed from 
the area of persecution under refugee law.145 OTP has made ex-
plicit reference to the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees (UNHCR) and its understanding of “persecutions on 
the basis of gender in refugee law.”146 UNHCR, for its part, has 
made clear that sexual orientation ought to be considered when 
an individual “has been subject to persecutory (including dis-
criminatory) action on account of his or her sexuality or sexual 
practices.”147 Such a reference by OTP, in its official position 
paper on gender no less, seems to be a strong signal that, at the 
very least, it has considered, albeit not officially and formally, 
how sexual orientation may fall within the Rome Statute’s def-
inition of “gender.” Lastly, and most importantly, OTP has 
stated that the definition of “gender” under Article 7(3) of the 
Rome Statute “acknowledges the social construction of gender, 
and the accompanying roles, behaviours, activities, and attrib-
utes assigned to women and men, and to girls and boys.”148 
Thus, it seems clear that OTP has acknowledged that it is open 
to a broader definition of “gender” than one that only contem-
plates the female/male distinction. 
Additionally, the definition of “gender” is not one that 
ought to change as one crosses borders. The definition does not 
 
 144. Id. at 3. 
 145. Id. at 19 n.34. 
 146. Id. (citing U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, Guidelines on Internation-
al Protection: Gender-Related Persecution Within the Context of Article 1A(2) of 
the 1951 Convention and/or Its 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refu-
gees, ¶¶ 3, 16, 17, 30, U.N. Doc. HCR/GIP/02/01 (May 7, 2002) [hereinafter 
U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees]). 
 147. U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, supra note 146, ¶ 16 (“A claimant’s 
sexuality or sexual practices may be relevant to a refugee claim where he or 
she has been subject to persecutory (including discriminatory) action on ac-
count of his or her sexuality or sexual practices. In many such cases, the 
claimant has refused to adhere to socially or culturally defined roles or expec-
tations of behaviour attributed to his or her sex. The most common claims in-
volve homosexuals, transsexuals or transvestites, who have faced extreme 
public hostility, violence, abuse, or severe or cumulative discrimination.”). 
 148. OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR, supra note 3, at 3. 
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allow for cultural relativity but instead requires a broad inter-
pretation of the meaning of gender, as laid out above.149 Indeed, 
the “within the context of society” part of the definition was in-
cluded so as to acknowledge these “sociological differences,” not 
to ignore them.150 
B. SOME ARGUE THAT THE DEFINITION OF “GENDER” 
CONTEMPLATES, AND REJECTS, INCLUSION OF THE LGBT 
COMMUNITY, YET THESE OBSERVATIONS ARE MISGUIDED 
Some commentators have argued that the Rome Statute 
has rejected the notion advocated by this Note, instead stating 
that, by defining “gender” along the biological male/female di-
vide, the Rome Statute has rejected any argument that this 
definition encompasses the rights of the LGBT community. 
However, these arguments ignore that sociological considera-
tions are a part of the “gender” definition and that sexual orien-
tation is itself a sociological construct. Subsection 1 explores 
these arguments while Subsection 2 establishes that the term 
“gender” inherently considers the sociological considerations. 
1. Arguments That the Rome Statute’s Definition of “Gender” 
Does Not Include the LGBT Community 
Those who posit that the definition of “gender” found in the 
Rome Statute does not cover members of the LGBT community 
base their argument on the understanding that the definition 
states that it applies “to the two sexes, male and female.”151 
Thus, the argument goes, the definition of “gender” has categor-
ically eliminated any meaning that goes beyond simply the bio-
logical differences between men and women. Yet, this under-
standing of the term contains two fatal flaws: (1) it conflates 
 
 149. See Kelly D. Askin, Crimes Within the Jurisdiction of the International 
Criminal Court, 10 CRIM. L.F. 33, 47–48 (1999). 
 150. Bedont & Hall-Martinez, supra note 141. 
 151. See, e.g., Rana Lehr-Lenardt, One Small Step for Women: Female-
Friendly Provisions in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 
16 BYU J. PUB. L. 317, 340 (2002) (“[G]ender means male and female, not ho-
mosexual.”); David Scheffer, The International Criminal Court, in ROUTLEDGE 
HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 67, 71 (William Schabas & Na-
dia Bernaz eds., 2011) (“[T]he term ‘gender,’ which is used as a category of dis-
criminatory conduct for the crime of persecution, can refer only ‘to the two 
sexes, male and female, within the context of society.’ Thus, at least in theory, 
widespread or systematic persecution based on other types of possible gender 
discrimination (gays, transvestites, bisexuals) might not qualify as a crime 
against humanity under the Rome Statute.”). 
  
1316 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [101:1287 
 
the terms “gender” and “sex”; and (2) it ignores the understand-
ing of the definition of “gender” by OTP, which explicitly 
acknowledges the social construction of the term. “Gender” and 
“sex” are two terms that mean crucially different things.152 In-
herently, the term “gender” recognizes the social differences 
and construction of gender identity norms, while the term “sex” 
does not. OTP has stated as much by acknowledging that in 
considering a gender-based crime, it is crucial that the social 
construction of the term be considered.153 Additionally, the 
phrase “within the context of society” was included in the text154 
and must be given meaning;155 indeed, this phrase indicates 
that sociological concerns must be part of any consideration of 
gender and not restricted simply to a distinction between men 
and women. Thus, it seems clear that these arguments that the 
definition of “gender” eliminated the LGBT from protection un-
der the Rome Statute ought to be rejected. 
2. How Sexual Preference Fits into the Definition of “Gender” 
It is important to recall that the term “gender,” and not 
“sex,” was included in the Rome Statute because of its broader 
meaning, which contemplates the social construction of gender 
and the roles that society applies to each gender.156 This delib-
erate choice in the process of the negotiations cannot mean 
nothing—every word and its choice should be given its appro-
priate meaning.157 In this case, the use of the word “gender” ex-
plicitly acknowledges that crimes based on gender, and not just 
 
 152. See HEAVEN CRAWLEY, REFUGEES AND GENDER: LAW AND PROCESS 
163 n.1 (2001). 
 153. See, e.g., OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR, supra note 3, at 3 (stating that 
the definition of “gender” “acknowledges the social construction of gender”). 
 154. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 7(3). 
 155. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31(1), May 23, 
1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 340, 8 I.L.M. 679, 691–92 (establishing the text of 
the treaty as the primary source for treaty interpretation). Other sources can 
be used to supplement that interpretation, but the text is to be consulted first 
“in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning given” to such words. 
See id. art. 31(1)–(2). 
 156. See Steains, supra note 73. 
 157. In statutory interpretation, it is well accepted that all words in a given 
statute or treaty should be recognized as having meaning. See, e.g., LARRY M. 
EIG, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: GENERAL PRINCI-
PLES AND RECENT TRENDS 13–14 (2011), https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/97 
-589.pdf (“A statute should be construed so that effect is given to all its provi-
sions, so that no part will be inoperative or superfluous, void or insignificant 
. . . .” (internal citations omitted)). 
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those based on the biological distinctions between men and 
women, will be recognized under the Rome Statute. 
As this aspect of social construction is acknowledged in the 
definition of “gender,” so too is the fact that this definition 
ought to cover members of the LGBT community. Sexual orien-
tation is itself a concept that is “social in origin.”158 Sexual ori-
entation is a socially constructed concept that is learned by 
humans and some follow certain “scripts” as it relates to how 
society expects them to behave sexually.159 Human sexuality it-
self is not something that is devoid of social pressures and the-
se forces ought to be recognized when analyzing gender-based 
crimes.160 
Indeed, some will likely argue that this group is one that 
does not need protection and will question the proposition that 
the LGBT community is a group at all; rather, many may argue 
that the immoral behavior of this group is targeted, not the in-
dividuals themselves. However, the adverse treatment of the 
LGBT community is in fact an acknowledgement that this 
group exists. By treating individuals who possess this “moral 
deficiency” as targets of persecution, those who deny these 
groups’ existence only affirm it. Their actions speak to the fact 
that their societies recognize such groups and, in recognition of 
individuals’ membership in that group, they are subjected to 
persecutory treatment. What may appear to be an outward re-
jection of the existence of the group of the LGBT community is 
in fact an implicit acknowledgement of the group’s actuality. 
Members of the LGBT community are targeted for these crimes 
because of society’s recognition of their membership in this 
group and certain individuals’ views of that group. The fact 
that LGBT individuals do not conform to society’s construction 
of gender is precisely why these gender-based crimes exist. The 
 
 158. Richard R. Troiden, The Formation of Homosexual Identities, 17 J. 
HOMOSEXUALITY 43, 44 (1989) (“Sexual conduct is primarily social in origin. 
Existing sociocultural arrangements define what sexuality is, the purposes it 
serves, its manner of expression, and what it means to be sexual. People learn 
to be sexual pretty much as they learn everything else. Women and men are 
born with an open-ended, diffuse, and relatively fluid capacity for bodily 
pleasure that is shaped and expressed through sexual scripts[,] . . . [which] are 
articulated by the wider culture . . . .” (citations omitted)). 
 159. Id. 
 160. See id.; see also JOHN H. GAGNON & WILLIAM SIMON, SEXUAL CON-
DUCT: THE SOCIAL SOURCES OF HUMAN SEXUALITY ix (2d ed. 2005) (introduc-
ing what has become known as the “social constructionist” view of human sex-
uality). 
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ICC certainly should acknowledge this social construction in its 
decisions to prosecute. 
C. THE INTERCONNECTEDNESS OF THE WORK DONE BY 
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS COURTS AND THAT OF THE ICC 
At first glance, it appears as though international human 
rights courts and the ICC have different roles in the interna-
tional judicial community. The role of human rights courts is 
more often viewed as a mechanism by which states are held re-
sponsible,161 while the ICC was established to bring individual 
actors to justice.162 However, the two are connected in that both 
promote and protect the same sets of rights; the ways in which 
they guarantee those rights may differ, but their roles are in-
terconnected so as to allow one to borrow from the other. Addi-
tionally, both are governed by principles of jus cogens, which 
apply to all international actors.163 As such, there is a consider-
able degree of practicality in courts recognizing and upholding 
a more or less uniform set of rights so as to conform with their 
complementary roles within the international system.164 It 
would be foolhardy for the international legal community col-
lectively to espouse differing sets of rights, which depended 
solely on under which jurisdiction a particular case fell. In fact, 
OTP has stated that it hopes to contribute to the international 
community’s growing understanding of the meaning of gender-
based violence, thus acknowledging the interconnectedness of 
the ICC’s work with the work of other human rights courts.165 
 
 161. See, e.g., European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 113, art. 
19 (“To ensure the observance of the engagements undertaken by the High 
Contracting Parties in the present Convention, there shall be set up . . . [a] 
European Court of Human Rights . . . .”). 
 162. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 1 (“An International Criminal Court 
(‘the Court’) is hereby established. It shall be a permanent institution and 
shall have the power to exercise its jurisdiction over persons for the most seri-
ous crimes of international concern . . . .” (emphasis added)). 
 163. See supra Part I.E. 
 164. See Harmen van der Wilt & Sandra Lyngdorf, Procedural Obligations 
Under the European Convention on Human Rights: Useful Guidelines for the 
Assessment of ‘Unwillingness’ and ‘Inability’ in the Context of the Complemen-
tarity Principle, 9 INT’L CRIM. L. REV. 39, 41–42 (2009) (“The concurrence of 
state responsibility and individual responsibility which is increasingly recog-
nized in legal doctrine is an incentive for courts to consult each other’s deci-
sions and elaborate, when appropriate and with the necessary modifications, 
on each other’s findings in the field of evidence and legal concepts.” (citations 
omitted)). 
 165. OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR, supra note 3, at 10–11 (“The objectives 
of the policy [of sexual and gender-based crimes] are to . . . [c]ontribute, 
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Jus cogens, which governs all conduct in the international 
community,166 and the complementarity of these courts sup-
ports a more well-defined set of rights to be protected. Jus 
cogens dictates that there is a duty to prosecute crimes against 
humanity,167 and when states have failed to bring justice to the 
victims of such crimes, the ICC has the role of prosecuting.168 
Many critics have pointed out that a failure of the ICC to pros-
ecute in certain regards can constitute a grant of amnesty to 
individuals who have committed atrocious crimes.169 The inac-
tion of the ICC, and domestic courts, leads to impunity for 
those individuals; thus, the ICC has a duty to prosecute crimes 
falling under this heading.170 
Indeed, the Rome Statute and the organic treaty of the 
ECHR, the European Convention on Human Rights, both de-
rive from similar principles. Notably, both treaties acknowledge 
that their purpose is to promote international “peace” and “jus-
tice.”171 Although each treaty invokes differing mechanisms for 
achieving these ends, both acknowledge that they are estab-
lished for similar purposes. Not only were these treaties de-
signed to uphold similar rights but also, in striving to meet the-
se goals, it is appropriate to compare their methods for doing 
so. 
Specifically in the area of persecution based on gender, 
“the ICC should also look outside of international criminal law 
for guidance” because of the fact that this relatively “newly 
identified [area of] gender-based persecution has not been ana-
lyzed in the same depth” as other crimes against humanity.172 
Because the area of gender was so contentious during the nego-
 
through its implementation, to the ongoing development of international ju-
risprudence regarding sexual and gender-based crimes.”). 
 166. JANIS, supra note 109. 
 167. Michael Scharf, The Letter of the Law: The Scope of the International 
Legal Obligation To Prosecute Human Rights Crimes, 59 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 41, 52–59 (1996). 
 168. See Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 17(1)(a). 
 169. See generally Scharf, supra note 167, at 41 (providing examples of 
countries that granted amnesty) (citing Michael Vickery & Naomi Roht-
Arriaza, Human Rights in Cambodia, in IMPUNITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN IN-
TERNATIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE 251 (Naomi Roht-Arriaza ed., 1995)). 
 170. See id. 
 171. Rome Statute, supra note 1, pmbl; European Convention on Human 
Rights, supra note 113, pmbl. 
 172. Valerie Oosterveld, Gender, Persecution, and the International Crimi-
nal Court: Refugee Law’s Relevance to the Crime Against Humanity of Gender-
Based Persecution, 17 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 49, 49 (2006). 
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tiation process and the ICC’s precedents offer little guidance in 
this area, the ICC should be even more willing to find guidance 
in the approaches of other courts.173 Therefore, when the ICC 
judges are exploring areas of the law yet to be broached by the 
ICC, they can and ought to find guidance in the work of other 
courts who have examined these issues.174 A judicial body, such 
as the ICC, with limited precedents and practice seems to be 
exactly the kind of court that could borrow from the experienc-
es of other courts that have grappled with similar issues. OTP 
itself has acknowledged the value of looking to precedents in 
refugee law, citing the work by Professor Oosterveld.175 
The Rome Statute itself provides guidance that seems to 
demonstrate that it is appropriate to consider human rights 
and the practices of other institutions. The standards of admis-
sibility of the ICC consider not only a complete failure of the 
national judicial systems but also “situations involving some 
judicial action, however in a manner that fails to conform with 
fundamental human rights.”176 Thus, the Rome Statute explicit-
ly recognizes that considerations of human rights are to be 
 
 173. See id. 
 174. See id. at 51–52. Oosterveld makes a link between international refu-
gee law and the developing area of law that is gender-based persecution under 
Article 7 of the Rome Statute:  
This link is helpful because international and domestic refugee law 
has explored certain elements of gender-related persecution that are, 
at present, unexplored in international criminal law. Therefore, when 
the ICC’s judges are determining the content of the elements of the 
crime against humanity of gender-based persecution, they should ex-
amine principles or rules found within refugee law. This is not to ar-
gue that a definition of gender-related persecution found within in-
ternational refugee law should be directly transferred to the crime 
against humanity of gender-based persecution. . . . Rather, the ICC 
should evaluate how refugee law approaches to gender-related perse-
cution can shed considerable light on international criminal law’s rel-
atively undeveloped understanding of gender-based persecution. Even 
if the ICC decides that certain aspects of refugee law relating to gen-
der-related persecution do not rise to the level of ‘principles and rules 
of international law’ or general principles of domestic law, they may 
still help guide the ICC toward a full understanding of gender-based 
persecution. 
Id. (citations omitted). Professor Oosterveld’s connection between refugee law 
and the crime of gender-based persecution is informative in this regard as 
well, as the ICC’s practices of prosecuting based on persecution of the LGBT 
community can borrow approaches and principles from other institutions and 
bodies of law that have previously addressed these issues. See id. 
 175. OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR, supra note 3, at 19 n.34. 
 176. Jessica Almqvist, Complementarity and Human Rights: A Litmus Test 
for the International Criminal Court, 30 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 335, 
339 (2008) (citing Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 20(3)). 
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weighed in determining whether or not a case should be 
brought in front of the ICC.177 Those same considerations ought 
to apply not only when evaluating domestic judicial action, but 
also when human rights violations are implicated. Most im-
portantly, the Rome Statute states that the tribunal shall apply 
“law . . . [that is] consistent with internationally recognized 
human rights, and . . . without any adverse distinction founded 
on grounds such as gender, as defined in article 7, paragraph 
3.”178 Thus, no matter what the definition of gender states, if 
human rights law protects members of the LGBT community, 
then the ICC must apply that law. 
It is quite clear that not only should the ICC consider acts 
of other human rights courts but also that the ICC must do so. 
Examining several cases from the ECHR and IACHR and de-
velopments in the international court generally179 makes clear 
that the international human rights community has made 
steps toward protecting members of the LGBT community and 
that ICC ought to do the same. 
III.  THE PRACTICES BY HUMAN RIGHTS COURTS AND 
DEVELOPMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW PROVIDE 
AVENUES TOWARD PROTECTING MEMBERS OF THE 
LGBT COMMUNITY IN THE ICC   
Other courts’ processes and means for protecting members 
of the LGBT community can be informative in determining how 
the ICC can do the same. Although the structures of human 
rights courts and the means by which they adopt their stand-
ards differ from a court with international criminal jurisdiction 
like the ICC, the framework under which the ECHR and the 
IACHR protect on the basis of sexual orientation can serve as a 
model for the ICC. Human rights courts, as protectors of speci-
fied civil liberties, and criminal courts, which punish those who 
violate those same rights, have a connected function in the in-
ternational judicial system. As such, the practices of one can in-
form the other. 
As the interconnectedness of the frameworks of the ICC 
and human rights courts have been established in Part II.C, 
Section A begins by employing the analyses from the ECHR 
and IACHR in the context of the ICC. Next, Section B proposes 
 
 177. See id. 
 178. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 21(3). 
 179. See supra Part I.F. 
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specific language OTP can adopt in order to make clear that the 
LGBT community is protected under the Rome Statute’s defini-
tion of “gender.” Section C addresses counterarguments some 
may levy against this proposal. Finally, Section D concludes by 
exploring developments in international law generally and con-
siders how they may inform the conversation. 
A. USING THE METHODS EMPLOYED BY HUMAN RIGHTS COURTS 
WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF THE ICC 
The ECHR and the IACHR employed logic that is not 
unique to the area of human rights law; indeed, the same logic 
can apply to the ICC’s persecution analysis under Article 
7(1)(h) of the Rome Statute. The ICC must look to other inter-
national law sources, particularly human rights courts, for 
precedent, especially in areas the ICC itself has not ad-
dressed.180 Although the ECHR and IACHR cases discussed 
above examined discrimination, the ICC can follow that ap-
proach when determining how to treat cases involving the mal-
treatment of the LGBT community. Additionally, the Rome 
Statute contains provisions, namely Article 21, which provide 
the same sort of recognitions of dignity that were vital in the 
analysis conducted by both the ECHR and IACHR.181 
Although discrimination and persecution both serve as dis-
tinct bases for crimes in these courts, their relationship is simp-
ly one of scale and gravity. What is most important in recogniz-
ing the relationship between the crimes of discrimination and 
persecution is that they are both founded in the same principle: 
targeting an individual because of that person’s membership in 
a particular group is impermissible. “[T]he dividing line be-
tween discrimination and persecution is not a clear one”; how-
ever, it is one that exists and under certain circumstances, “dis-
crimination can constitute persecution.”182 It may be helpful to 
imagine the two concepts on a spectrum, where conduct that is 
considered discriminatory can cross into being considered per-
secution once a certain threshold is breached. There is a pre-
dominant view that in order for “non-violent discrimination to 
amount to persecution, a high threshold of that form of ill-
 
 180. See supra Part II.C. 
 181. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 21. 
 182. U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, Guidelines on the Protection of Refu-
gee Women, ¶ 55, U.N. Doc. EC/SCP/67 (July 22, 1991). 
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treatment [must] be surmounted.”183 Where that line is remains 
a question that cannot be easily answered. However, knowing 
that there is a point at which discriminatory behavior trans-
forms into persecution is an important consideration in apply-
ing the case law of the ECHR and IACHR to the ICC. Although 
none of the cases addressed by these two human rights courts 
has dealt with persecution per se, it is accepted, both by the 
Rome Statute184 and more generally,185 that gender-specific dis-
crimination is the kind of conduct that will fall under the juris-
diction of the ICC if it rises to the level of persecution. 
Understanding this relationship is crucial in understand-
ing how the jurisprudence surrounding discrimination law in 
international human rights courts can be applied to the ICC. 
Clearly, the fact that these human rights courts have ad-
dressed the maltreatment of the LGBT community within the 
context of discrimination should not hinder the ICC from adopt-
ing the approaches of these courts. In fact, as persecution is a 
harsher form of discrimination, the ICC should be eager to 
prosecute when it is faced with a set of facts that would amount 
to the gravity and severity required to move a crime from the 
realm of discrimination to persecution. Further, the ECHR and 
IACHR have found it proper to extend their protection to mem-
bers of the LGBT community despite the fact that their ena-
bling treaties refer only to discrimination based on “sex” rather 
than based on “gender.”186 Although “sex” is viewed as the nar-
rower of the two terms,187 the LGBT community has been pro-
tected under this heading and the same logic can certainly be 
applied under a broader “gender” framework. 
Therefore, in order to apply the same analysis from the 
human rights courts discussed above, what must first be identi-
fied is a principle within the Rome Statute that recognizes the 
right to dignity for all individuals. The character of the treaty 
itself may serve as a starting point in this regard; however, a 
 
 183. Robin Tam, Immigration Judicial Review: Essential Respondent Cas-
es, 5 JUD. REV. 121, 125 (2000). 
 184. See Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 7(1)(h) (listing “gender” as a pro-
tected group under the persecution provision of the crimes against humanity 
article). 
 185. Bret Thiele, Persecution on Account of Gender: A Need for Refugee Law 
Reform, 11 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 221, 231 (2000) (“[T]ransgression of social 
mores and sexual discrimination can rise to the level of persecution.”). 
 186. See European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 113, art. 14; 
Inter-American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 129, art. 1. 
 187. See supra Part II.A. 
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more specific view on the topic can be found in Article 21, the 
provision on the applicable law of the ICC.188 In full, Article 21 
states the following: 
(1) The Court shall apply: 
(a) In the first place, this Statute, Elements of Crimes and its 
Rules of Procedure and Evidence; 
(b) In the second place, where appropriate, applicable treaties 
and the principles and rules of international law, including the 
established principles of the international law of armed conflict; 
(c) Failing that, general principles of law derived by the Court 
from national laws of legal systems of the world including, as ap-
propriate, the national laws of States that would normally exer-
cise jurisdiction over the crime, provided that those principles are 
not inconsistent with this Statute and with international law and 
internationally recognized norms and standards. 
(2) The Court may apply principles and rules of law as interpreted in 
its previous decisions. 
(3) The application and interpretation of law pursuant to this article 
must be consistent with internationally recognized human rights, and 
be without any adverse distinction founded on grounds such as gen-
der, as defined in article 7, paragraph 3, age, race, colour, language, 
religion or belief, political or other opinion, national, ethnic or social 
origin, wealth, birth or other status.189 
Most crucially for the purposes of this Note, this provision 
recognizes the importance of (1) looking to other sources of in-
ternational law for guidance; (2) that the applicable law of the 
ICC should conform to human rights law; and (3) the applica-
tion of the law should be done in a way that does not bring an 
“adverse distinction” to any group. These first two points make 
clear that looking to the law of the ECHR and IACHR for guid-
ance is appropriate; the last states that the LGBT community 
should not be deprived of the protection afforded to other 
groups. 
When viewed in conjunction with one another, these two 
establish a crucial premise: no person shall be persecuted un-
der the jurisdiction of the ICC and the ICC ought to enforce the 
law so as to prevent distinction among the groups enumerated 
in Article 21. The overarching principle found within Article 
21(3) is the equal application of laws in such a way that no par-
ticular group is disadvantaged. Of course, sexual orientation is 
not listed explicitly as a protected ground, but this Note’s dis-
cussion of the Rome Statute’s definition of “gender” demon-
strates that the LGBT community can, and should, fit under 
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this heading. Justice clearly calls for the equal protection of the 
law to extend to this group and the practices of human rights 
courts such as the ECHR and IACHR indicate that work is al-
ready being done on this front. In order to best “guarantee last-
ing respect for and the enforcement of international justice”190 
the ICC must adopt a policy of prosecuting those who persecute 
members of the LGBT community. 
B. OTP SHOULD ADOPT AN EXPLICIT POLICY RECOGNIZING 
THAT MEMBERS OF THE LGBT COMMUNITY ARE COVERED 
UNDER THE ROME STATUTE’S FORMULATION OF “GENDER” 
In order to effectuate a more open and natural reading of 
the Rome Statute’s definition of “gender,” it is crucial that OTP 
promulgate an official, explicit policy that makes clear that 
members of the LGBT community fall within this definition. 
OTP holds an important role in that it is the body that both 
brings crimes in front of the ICC and it plays a crucial role in 
deciphering the text of the Rome Statute when determining 
what cases can and cannot be brought before the ICC.191 OTP 
has not shied away from interpreting its obligations, outlining 
its understanding of certain aspects of the Rome Statute, and 
proclaiming future goals;192 therefore, such a step by OTP is by 
no means radical or an invalid extension of its power. OTP has 
signaled that it may be moving in this direction by stressing 
that the definition of “gender” involves sociological considera-
tions193 and by making clear that it will continue to focus on 
gendered crimes going forward.194 Such a policy could take the 
form of the following language: 
Recognizing that the current definition of “gender” found within the 
Rome Statute: (1) was the result of contentious debates; (2) arose in 
an environment in which the rights of the LGBT community were not 
as widely accepted as they are today; and (3) was ultimately adopted 
in order to acknowledge both the biological and sociological differ-
 
 190. Rome Statute, supra note 1, pmbl. 
 191. See supra notes 15–16 and accompanying text. 
 192. For a list of papers on policy and strategy OTP has released, see Poli-
cies and Strategies, INT’L CRIM. CT., https://www.icc-cpi.int/about/otp/Pages/ 
otp-policies.aspx (last visited Nov. 28, 2016) (including policy papers on the 
following topics: “Policy Paper on the Interest of Justice,” “Policy Paper on Vic-
tims’ Participation,” “Policy Paper on Sexual and Gender-Based Crimes,” “OTP 
Strategic Plan 2016–2018,” and “Draft Policy Paper on Case Selection and Pri-
oritisation”). 
 193. See OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR, supra note 3, passim. 
 194. Strategic Plan: 2016–2018, INT’L CRIM. CT. (Nov. 16, 2015), https:// 
www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/otp/EN-OTP_Strategic_Plan_2016-2018.pdf. 
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ences between members of different gendered identities, OTP 
acknowledges that members of the LGBT community are covered un-
der the Rome Statute’s definition of “gender.” OTP, the ICC itself, and 
the negotiators of the Rome Statute have all long recognized that the 
term “gender” included sociological considerations and this policy 
serves as an explicit recognition that members of the LGBT communi-
ty who are subjected to persecutory conduct (that meets all other re-
quirements) will be considered to be a gendered group under Article 7 
of the treaty. Not only does a plain reading of the words employed by 
the Rome Statute inform this interpretation, but so does the ICC’s fol-
lowing obligations to: (1) conform to human rights law generally; and 
(2) apply the law in such a way as not to adversely affect distinct 
groups. As such, OTP concludes that it has the jurisdiction to prose-
cute those who have targeted members of the LGBT community un-
der Article 7. 
Without such an explicit policy, the debate on whether or 
not crimes committed against the LGBT community can be 
brought in front of the ICC will continue. Until the OTP takes 
action, the same arguments advanced by both sides will be re-
cycled and it is unlikely that any progress will be made on this 
front. Although some signatories to the Rome Statute may be 
opposed to such an interpretation, this result is one that flows 
naturally from the negotiations of the treaty and the develop-
ments in international law. 
Many practical barriers to prosecution still exist,195 but 
with this threshold question resolved, OTP will be enabled to 
 
 195. Both the limited resources of the ICC and the desires of victims are of 
tantamount concern. See Paper on Some Policy Issues Before the Office of the 
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and Truth Commissions Meet, 49 EMORY L.J. 205, 215–20 (2000). While these 
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bring crimes committed against the LGBT community in front 
of the ICC. The result of such an explicit policy by OTP is that 
the debate over whether or not persecutors of the LGBT com-
munity are subject to criminal investigation and prosecution 
under the Rome Statute will end and then, and only then, will 
the ICC be empowered to punish such offenders. Many gay and 
lesbian individuals throughout the world suffer persecution on 
a daily basis at the hands of the state and private individuals 
uncontrolled by the government.196 Those individuals should not 
be made to continue to suffer in silence before the ICC; rather, 
their hardships should be acknowledged and their persecutors 
should be brought to justice when governments are unwilling or 
unable to act. The ICC does not need to restructure itself in or-
der to address this problem because it already has all the nec-
essary requisites to protect the LGBT community. All that is 
needed is action within the bounds of the power of OTP and 
ICC, and such a step is required by the Rome Statute, interna-
tional law, and justice. 
C. OTP ADOPTING SUCH A POLICY WOULD NOT VIOLATE THE 
TREATY NOR THE SOVEREIGNTY OF THE SIGNATORY STATES 
While the proposed language may certainly be promulgat-
ed by OTP, some may argue that such language would not only 
constitute a “bait and switch” but would also violate both the 
sovereignty of member states and the structure of the ICC. 
This Section addresses both of those arguments and concludes 
that they are not sufficient to defeat this proposal. 
The first argument that critics of this proposal may sug-
gest is that signatories to the original language did not agree to 
this “new” interpretation. However, this is not the case; signa-
tories agreed to the ambiguous language found within the trea-
ty, fully aware that such language could be interpreted multi-
ple ways. Additionally, these signatories agreed to abide by 
international human rights standards, which, as has been dis-
cussed above, support such a reading. 
Yet another, seemingly more legitimate, counterargument 
to this proposal stems from the concept that the signatory 
states have not sacrificed their sovereignty in signing the Rome 
Statute; rather than the ICC manufacturing the norms with 
 
siderations while noting that such an interpretation by OTP may not lead to 
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 196. See supra Part I.A. 
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which such states must comply, the ICC should simply enforce 
violations of norms already in place at the national level. This 
sort of criticism could be seen as a “bottom-up” approach: the 
norms ought to come from the states themselves and the ICC 
simply has the role of enforcing those norms. However, such a 
criticism ignores the primary role of the ICC: to supplement the 
judiciary efforts of states when those states have failed to act in 
accordance with international human rights norms. In such a 
system, the norms are indeed coming from the “bottom-up” be-
cause the violations of those norms on the ground in the signa-
tory states is what is creating the need for the ICC to act. 
Member states are indeed identifying the areas in which the 
ICC must act by failing to protect the rights of certain groups. 
D. DEVELOPMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW GENERALLY 
INDICATE A MOVEMENT TOWARD PROTECTING THE LGBT 
COMMUNITY AND THE ICC SHOULD FOLLOW THIS TREND 
Such a reading of the Rome Statute would be consistent 
with trends in international law, a consideration that is re-
quired both by logic and the Rome Statute itself. Individual 
countries and the international community as a whole have 
seen changes in their respective approaches to LGBT rights 
such that the ICC would not be blazing a new, unexplored 
trail.197 The ECHR has acknowledged that the LGBT communi-
ty is a group in need of protection and that doing so is proper.198 
Its view is that international law’s developments and a chang-
ing view of the rights of the LGBT community have had a pro-
found impact on the ICC and its treatment of disparate treat-
ment on the basis of sexual orientation.199 The rights of the 
LGBT community, once ignored as an international problem, 
has taken hold in the international community and has been 
recognized in various parts of the world.200 While LGBT rights 
may once have been “subject to easy change by shifting majori-
ties” because of a disjointed world community view on this 
group, history has taught the international community that the 
rights of homosexuals and transgendered individuals “are so 
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essential that [they ought to be] entrench[ed]” in the interna-
tional community and the ICC itself.201 
Although there has been change, more is needed to stop 
the crimes that are currently being perpetrated against mem-
bers of the LGBT community. The international community at 
large has made strides, but there are others within the com-
munity that refuse to acknowledge the rights of this group.202 
The ICC may in fact play an important role in deterring these 
crimes203 as it has the ability to bring many of those offenders 
under its jurisdiction. The international community has not yet 
demonstrated a willingness to universally recognize this group 
and this alone shows how crucial it is that the ICC intervene. 
As has been demonstrated, not only does the ICC have the abil-
ity to do so, it must do so in order to fulfill its mandate and pro-
tect this distinct group. 
CONCLUSION 
The LGBT community has been the target of crimes 
against humanity and the world community’s reluctance to 
acknowledge this group’s rights in the ICC is complicit in their 
persecution. OTP has made several suggestions that it may be 
willing to consider the LGBT community to fall under the defi-
nition of “gender,” yet that definition has sparked intense de-
bate since it was first introduced into the Rome Statute. How-
ever, the attitudes of the international community have been 
moving toward recognition that the rights of the LGBT com-
munity must be realized under human rights law. The practic-
es of the ECHR and IACHR demonstrate that this population 
has been protected by human rights courts and those courts’ 
methodology can be utilized by the ICC. 
This Note suggests that the language of the Rome Statute 
itself does not need revision; rather, what is needed is an ex-
plicit policy by OTP recognizing that members of the LGBT 
community qualify as a protected group under the Rome Stat-
ute’s definition of “gender.” Such a policy aligns the obligations 
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of the ICC with the realities of both the international communi-
ty in general and also the practices of human rights courts. By 
embracing the ambiguity employed by the drafters of the Rome 
Statute and adopting the propriety of other international 
courts, the ICC can see a path before it wherein crimes of per-
secution directed at the LGBT community will be punished ac-
cordingly. Such an understanding of the definition of “gender,” 
especially when acknowledged explicitly by OTP, will be the 
first move towards protecting vulnerable LGBT communities 
under the Rome Statute. 
